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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper1 describes the nature of digital intelligence and 
provides context for the material published as a result of 
the actions of National Security Agency (NSA) contractor 
Edward Snowden. Digital intelligence is presented as 
enabled by the opportunities of global communications 
and private sector innovation and as growing in response 
to changing demands from government and law 
enforcement, in part mediated through legal, parliamentary 
and executive regulation. A common set of organizational 
and ethical norms based on human rights considerations 
are suggested to govern such modern intelligence activity 
(both domestic and external) using a three-layer model 
of security activity on the Internet: securing the use of 
the Internet for everyday economic and social life; the 
activity of law enforcement — both nationally and through 
international agreements — attempting to manage 
criminal threats exploiting the Internet; and the work of 
secret intelligence and security agencies using the Internet 
to gain information on their targets, including in support 
of law enforcement.
INTRODUCTION
The Snowden material has exposed — to unprecedented 
and uncomfortable international gaze — the world 
of digital intelligence and the technical success of US 
agencies and those of its close intelligence allies in 
adapting their processes to the opportunities the Internet 
provides. The protection of personal information from 
unlawful exploitation, and the legality, proportionality 
and adequacy of regulation of digital intelligence access 
1 The contents of this paper and opinions given in it are the sole 
responsibility of the author in his capacity as visiting professor at King’s 
College London. They should not be taken as an expression of the views 
of the British government, which continues neither to confirm nor deny 
allegations made in the media about the operational activity of British 
intelligence in the light of the material leaked by Edward Snowden.
and intelligence sharing have become major international 
political issues. This paper looks at the dynamic interaction 
between demands from government and law enforcement 
for digital intelligence, and at the new possibilities that 
digital technology has opened up for meeting such 
demands. Inevitably, the paper has an “Anglo-Saxon” 
bias, given that American influence on the Internet so 
far has been so great, an understandable situation given 
the origins of the Internet and the sources of investment 
and innovation that have driven it thus far. The Snowden 
allegations have highlighted what many nations see as 
this US “home field” advantage in economic terms, as well 
as in the scale and reach of modern digital intelligence 
giving the United States a “hard power” advantage. The 
alleged range of targets of US intelligence included the 
chancellor of Germany and the president of Brazil and set 
off firestorms of diplomatic protests led by those nations. 
The disclosures also put the long-standing “Five Eyes“ (the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand) partnership in signals intelligence (SIGINT) 
under unparalleled scrutiny and became an issue in the 
New Zealand general election. The debate in the European 
Union over personal privacy in a data-rich world in which 
the private sector harvests significant amounts of personal 
information was already complex,2 but the Snowden 
allegations have made this and other international debates 
intense and at times toxic.3 That, in turn, has led to some 
nations exploiting the issues for protectionist purposes to 
benefit their domestic industry in terms of data localization 
and procurement restrictions from US suppliers. Overall, 
the adequacy of the previous regimes of legal powers 
and governance arrangements is seriously challenged 
just at a time when the objective need for intelligence on 
the serious threats facing civil society is apparent. This 
paper suggests areas where it might be possible to derive 
international norms, regarded as promoting standards of 
accepted behaviour that might gain widespread, if not 
universal, international acceptance, for the safe practice of 
digital intelligence. 
2  Discussion of a controversial new draft European Union Regulation 
on Data Protection and a specific new Data Protection Directive for 
law enforcement continues. See http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/.
3  The European Parliament, for example, has called for suspension of 
the “safe harbour” arrangements for sharing data on European citizens 
with the United States and the suspension of the US/EU Terrorist Finance 
Tracking Programme that had generated significant intelligence, helping 
to detect terrorist plots and trace their authors.
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ORIGINS OF DIGITAL INTELLIGENCE
The interception of written communications — and, when 
necessary, their decipherment — and the monitoring of 
patterns of communication are practices of considerable 
antiquity. SIGINT derived from electromagnetic emissions 
developed during World War II and the Cold War into a 
recognized major intelligence capability. The Internet is a 
major source of comparable intelligence power today.
Recent years have seen the development of powerful 
tools of digital intelligence driven by the dynamic 
interaction of two coincidental developments: on the one 
hand, the increasing public, corporate and government 
use of the Internet and digital data, making possible an 
unprecedented supply of information about individuals 
and their activity, movements and location; and on the other 
hand, the evolution of national demands for intelligence 
on non-state actors, in particular for the United States and 
its allies on terrorists after the attacks on New York and 
Washington, DC on September 11. Supply and demand 
have interacted dynamically with technological advances 
and popular apps, making possible new opportunities for 
accessing information, helping to meet insistent demands 
for information about suspects that have in turn driven 
the development of more ingenious uses of digital data 
to derive intelligence. This dynamic interaction is set to 
continue.
SUPPLY-SIDE CONSIDERATIONS
The digital revolution has wrought profound changes 
in the technological environment in which intelligence 
agencies operate, in particular, the growth in global 
communications with the network of packet-switched 
networks4 that comprises the Internet and carries the World 
Wide Web. The adoption of open Internet and network 
protocols allowed rapid innovation in applications 
attractive to business and consumers alike and the 
development of public key cryptography5 made online 
monetary transactions feasible. The resulting popularity 
of the Internet as a means of personal communication as 
well as business, the development of the Web (and, more 
4 Packet switching describes the type of digital communication 
network in which relatively small units of data called packets are routed 
by computers (servers) through a network based on the destination 
address contained within each packet, normally directed to take the least 
congested and therefore cheapest route at that instant. 
5  Public key encryption was first discovered by mathematicians 
at the UK signals intelligence agency, Government Communications 
Headquarters (GCHQ). See www.gchq.gov.uk/history/Pages/Recent-
History-technology-challenges.aspx.
recently, the so-called dark Web6) and the ability to cheaply 
transfer, store and mine digital data have all transformed 
the opportunities for obtaining secret intelligence. 
Understanding the changing nature of the potential supply 
of intelligence from the Internet thus involves recognizing 
the potential represented by:
• the digitization of communications and the advent of 
packet-switched networks to carry all forms of digital 
communications; 
• the availability of relevant data (such as 
communications traffic records and Internet 
metadata7) already in digital form, which means 
that it is economically viable to store data in bulk 
and to examine it and combine it with other datasets 
to identify matches and patterns of interest to an 
intelligence analyst seeking to discover new leads on 
a target;
• the growth in voice and video communications 
carried over the Internet, with Voice over Internet 
Protocol applications (such as Skype and FaceTime) 
replacing many terrestrial telephone calls using 
subscriber dialing;
• the widespread use of mobile devices to access the 
Internet and their impact on the interception of “data 
in motion”;8 
• the impact of cheap data storage and processing on 
the digitization of back offices of both companies 
and government departments (such as passports, 
national insurance records, bank account details, 
airline reservations and so on), making “stored data” 
a valuable source of digital intelligence;
• the use by governments and armed forces of Virtual 
Private Networks using the Internet Protocol (IP) 
carried on the Internet and mixed with other packet-
switched communications, rather than traditional 
6  The dark Net, or dark Web, describes networks that are only 
accessible by trusted peers, with measures to ensure that the addresses 
and identities of participants are not discoverable, for example, to allow 
markets for narcotics and other criminal transactions to be operated with 
transactions in Bitcoin.
7  Packet-switched networks rely on “headers” being attached to data 
packets that identify their destination and routing and enable the entire 
message to be recomposed on arrival, even when individual packets 
have taken different routes through cyberspace. Traffic data is normally 
defined by an analogy with old-fashioned telephone billing that lists 
who called whom, when, from where and for how long. The Internet age 
extends the metadata to include such information as the browsing history 
of an individual or their digitized list of contacts.
8  A useful, if crude, distinction can be drawn between intelligence 
agencies intercepting communications and information about 
communications — data in motion — and agencies accessing data held in 
digital data bases, including in the Cloud — stored data.
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dedicated high-frequency/very high-frequency/
ultra high-frequency wireless networks;
• the commercial use of strong encryption in enabling 
secure financial transactions and communications 
and in securing mobile devices from unauthorized 
access;
• the use of a range of technologies that can provide 
locational data on mobile devices;
• the use of Cloud services both for storing consumer-
related information and for enabling mobile devices 
to use advanced programs such as mapping, aerial 
photography and street views too large to be stored 
on the device itself; and
• the widespread use of social media, texting, tweeting 
and blogging, all of which may provide information 
on the identity and associations of suspects. 
No doubt, in the near future, digital “wearables” will also 
be popularized as consumer goods (an example is the 
bracelet that takes pulse and heart rate measurements and 
links to the owner’s mobile phone — and, in the future, 
possibly directly to the doctor’s office to warn of impending 
trouble). In the future, the Internet will be connected to 
a wide range of other devices (the so-called “Internet of 
things” or, more recently, “the Internet of Everything”), 
again increasing the stock of information that is relatable 
to an individual and from which useful intelligence might 
be derived.
On the other hand, the Internet and its digital applications 
also offer added potential for those who wish to hide their 
communications:
• The huge growth in the volume of data9 carried 
by global communications networks reduces the 
probability of interception of any given email, text 
or other message10 and packet switching means that 
only parts of a message may be recovered. Microsoft 
has over a billion users of its Cloud services with 
1.3 billion email addresses sending four billion emails 
a day and uploading 1.5 billion photographs a month. 
Skype calls via the Internet are taking up two billion 
minutes per day.
9  According to an NSA document revealed by Snowden, the NSA 
touches about 1.6 percent of total Internet traffic, estimated at 1826 
petabytes of information a day. However, of the 1.6 percent of the data, 
the document states that only 0.025 percent is actually selected for review, 
so the net effect is that NSA analysts look at 0.00004 percent of the world’s 
traffic in conducting their mission (less than one part in a million) (Ball 
2013). 
10  Examples include financial and commodity market trading, 
streaming video services (such as Netflix, as well as educational services) 
and massively multiplayer online role-playing games.
• There is a wide choice of social media platforms, chat 
rooms, drop boxes and other apps, not just the most 
well-known ones, and many are hosted overseas, 
complicating the surveillance task, especially if it 
becomes known which are less able to be accessed by 
the authorities.
• The provision of communications channels in 
multiplayer role games enables virtual “meetings” 
inside games.
• The availability to the user of very strong commercial 
encryption such as Pretty Good Privacy that, if 
implemented correctly, means that for all practical 
purposes the content of an encrypted message does 
not represent a cost-effective target for the authorities.
• The development of anonymizing software, such as 
Tor,11 which hides the IP address of the user’s device 
from an intercepting agency.
• The ease with which, given digital communications, 
steganography12 can be used to conceal messages 
or malware even when the communication is 
intercepted.
The public is only now beginning to recognize — 
stimulated by the controversy over digital privacy that 
the Snowden affair has generated — the business model 
that makes the Internet economically viable, and cheap to 
the user, indeed largely free at the point of use. Personal 
information of users can be collected and monetized, and 
sold for marketing and other purposes. This complex 
metadata ecosystem has driven the massive take-up of 
easily available software applications (now universally 
just called apps) for mobile devices and the rapid adoption 
of social media (of which there are thousands of different 
variants available worldwide). Such developments have 
transformed the ease and variety of ways of interacting 
digitally between individuals and within groups, and 
have made multimedia ubiquitous — video, photograph, 
graphic and text all combined. A further relevant 
development has been the provision of Cloud services, not 
just for easily accessible data storage, but also to enable 
mobile devices to access very powerful software programs 
too large to fit on individual devices, such as search and 
inference engines able to recognize context and thus be 
faster and more efficient, translation to and from multiple 
languages and voice-activated inquiries. The benefits to the 
11  Tor, or The Onion Router, was developed by the US Navy to make 
impractical the identification of the sender of communications traffic, and 
its use by dissidents under repressive regimes such as in Iran has been 
encouraged. It is now a main route to the criminal websites to be found 
on the dark Web.
12  The hiding of messages from plain sight, for example, concealed at 
very small scale beneath digitized photographs or graphics or in the code 
of instructions for a program. 
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consumer are faster, more appropriate responses to search 
engine requests, relevant “pop-up” advertisements on 
websites and apps and free or cheap services. The private 
sector is thus expert at harvesting, for its own commercial 
purposes, data on the Internet usage of its customers, 
which is of considerable interest to intelligence and law 
enforcement for the reasons explained in the demand 
section below. 
DEMAND-SIDE CONSIDERATIONS
The basic purpose of intelligence is to improve the quality of 
decision making by reducing ignorance. Secret intelligence 
achieves that purpose in respect of information that others 
are trying their best to prevent from being discovered. 
The traditional requirements for secret intelligence 
drawn up by governments for their intelligence agencies 
were dominated by security concerns over potentially 
(or actually) hostile states. The priorities were acquiring 
intelligence on the military capabilities (organization, 
order of battle, equipment and doctrine) and intentions of 
states and their armed forces, and providing early warning 
of emerging threats. National security, including counter-
intelligence and counter-subversion work, has been the 
staple diet of intelligence and security agencies around 
the world. These demands for military and diplomatic 
intelligence of course continue, in particular to support 
current military operations and where national enmities 
and rivalries persist. To a large degree, however, meeting 
even these traditional tasks nowadays requires, for the 
reasons stated earlier, access to and understanding of 
digital communications and Internet use.
Most intelligence services around the world have also 
experienced a sea change over the last decade toward 
helping improve decision making for the purpose of 
public safety and security. Agencies have increasingly 
been called upon to target individuals, so-called non-
state actors, to help counter international and domestic 
terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD),13 narcotics and people trafficking, pedophile 
networks and other serious international crime including, 
most recently, cybercrime. The emergence of al-Qaeda 
and violent jihadist groups as a global phenomenon has 
created widespread public concern in many nations and a 
need for governments to reassure their publics over their 
management of the terrorist threat. Digital intelligence has 
proved invaluable in providing leads, such as identifying 
the contacts of terrorist facilitators, part of an intelligence 
13  Although there are many instances of states being behind proliferation 
of WMD, individuals have also been important, such as AQ Khan and his 
global commercial network of technology suppliers. See Corera (2006). 
chain that can allow the disruption of a terrorist plot14 and 
as a tool after an attack to identify others in the conspiracy.15 
For many nations, such intelligence work is reflected in a 
broadening of how national security is perceived in terms 
of anticipating threats to everyday life in addition to the 
traditional preoccupation with defence from external 
attack.16 This shift has been described17 as that from “the 
Secret State” to “the Protecting State,” where it is the direct 
security of the public rather than that of the institutions 
of the state that is the focus of national security. Some 
relevant implications of these changes in demand include 
the following:
• secret intelligence becoming (for the democracies at 
least) a legitimate and avowed arm of government, 
regulated by legislation;
• a wider “customer”18 base for secret intelligence than 
in the past, including local as well as national police 
forces, border and immigration authorities, revenue 
and customs, and domestic homeland security 
planners;
• a much higher proportion of effort19 than hitherto 
going on analysis relating to terrorists and other 
individuals of intelligence interest to establish their 
identities, associations, activities and intentions, 
movements, and financing;
• erosion, from the point of view of the customer, of 
intelligence of the traditional distinctions between 
domestic and overseas spheres for intelligence 
collection since, for example, a terrorist plot may well 
14  The director general of the British Security Service has publicly 
given credit to the invaluable nature of such intelligence that frustrated 
a number of terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom in the latter half of 
2014, but has emphasized the “jigsaw” nature of the intelligence work 
(Parker 2015). 
15  See www.theguardian.com/world/live/2015/jan/09/charlie-
hebdo-manhunt-kouachi-terrorist-links-live-updates.
16  The United States, India, the United Kingdom, France, Switzerland, 
the Philippines and Singapore, to take a range of examples, have brought 
together at the highest levels responsibility for policy on external national 
security and internal domestic or “homeland” security (including the 
response to civil emergencies) into a National Security Council.
17  See, for example, Omand (2010).
18  The term customer is used in this paper to cover the varied recipients 
of intelligence reporting. The term does not imply the need for any 
financial relationship between customer and the supplier of intelligence.
19  For example, on September 11, 2001, only about 1,300 Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI) agents, or six percent of the FBI’s total personnel, 
worked on counterterrorism. By 2003, that had risen to 16 percent. By 
2003, over 70 percent of British Security Service effort was devoted to 
countering terrorism. See National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
(n.d.) and Manningham-Buller (2003). 
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have both domestic and external components, leads 
about which need to be brought together;20
• in both criminal and civil cases, the prosecution’s 
use in court of evidence derived from intelligence 
and consequent issues over disclosure of sensitive 
operational details;
• the value of mutual sharing of intelligence-derived 
leads and tip-offs, and threat warnings with partners 
overseas to a much greater extent than in the past, 
both through police channels such as the International 
Criminal Police Organization and the European 
Police Office and between national intelligence 
agencies and counterterrorism analysis centres — 
this sharing now also includes the development 
of arrangements for supporting UN requirements 
for intelligence for their peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement missions;
• greater influence for the customers over intelligence 
collection priorities focused on intelligence reporting 
that could provide opportunities to take early action 
to protect the public or deployed armed forces, 
as against more traditional strategic intelligence 
analysis;
• especial interest in the identification (including 
biometrics) of individual suspects who are using the 
Internet under multiple aliases, and the geo-location 
in near-real time of individuals of counterterrorism 
interest; and
• the growth of interest in intelligence to support 
economic well-being, including anticipating 
key natural resource scarcities21 and identifying 
corruption, fraud and detection of market rigging 
including by cyber means. 
The growth in cyber threats, both malicious and criminally 
inspired, has made nations much more aware of the value 
of digital intelligence techniques to:
• help detect, classify and, where possible, attribute 
cyber attacks, including the theft of intellectual 
property;
• understand the nature of advanced persistent cyber 
threats (advanced since they involve exploiting 
20  A number of nations, including the United States, the United 
Kingdom, France and Germany, have created counterterrorism analysis 
centres where police and internal security and external communications 
intelligence analysts can work together to uncover terrorist plots, advise 
on threat warnings and alert states.
21  An example is the group of rare earth minerals essential for electronic 
devices used in the defence, alternative energy and communications 
industries, and where 97 percent of world production is in China 
(Chapple 2012).
vulnerabilities in software that firewalls will not 
detect, and persistent since the attacks will continue 
until there is a successful penetration) — such threats 
include the potential for disruptive cyber attacks on 
the critical national infrastructure and on systems 
essential for the effectiveness of military operations; 
and
• provide the means for designing and launching 
offensive cyber operations22 to support military 
operations and for covert actions carried out in 
cyberspace.
THE RESULTING DIGITAL INTELLIGENCE 
ENVIRONMENT
The coincidence of the modern digital communications and 
storage revolution and the post-September 11 demands for 
intelligence on suspects and their networks will be familiar 
to all modern intelligence agencies. It is less a question 
of how many terrorist attacks, criminal plots and cyber 
attacks have been stopped because of specific interception 
of terrorist intent in their communications and much more 
the unique contribution digital intelligence sources make 
to the intelligence jigsaw and the painstaking process of 
“discovery” of terrorist cells and involved individuals. This 
dynamic interaction between supply and demand forms 
the background to the allegations of Edward Snowden23 
about the advanced digital intelligence capabilities of the 
NSA and its many overseas partners.24 
Two issues have often been conflated in the subsequent 
controversies over the scale and intrusiveness of digital 
intelligence activity both in relation to international 
human rights and in intelligence activity apparently 
22  A number of nations, including the United States and the United 
Kingdom, have admitted to seeking offensive cyber capabilities; others 
such as Russia, China and Iran have already implicitly demonstrated 
capabilities, either governmental or by so-called “patriotic hackers” 
based in those nations.
23  An indexed guide to the material published as a result of Edward 
Snowden’s actions can be found at www.lawfareblog.com/catalog-
of-the-snowden-stored/#.UuBEdxDTk2w, and commentary at 
www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/01/catalog_of_snow.html.
24  The long-standing Five Eyes partner agencies of the US NSA are 
the UK GCHQ, Canadian Communications Security Establishment, 
Australian Digital Signals Directorate and New Zealand Government 
Communications Security Bureau. In addition, Snowden has revealed 
networks of bilateral and multilateral digital intelligence relationships 
with countries such as the “SIGINT Seniors”: the Five Eyes plus France, 
Germany, Sweden, Italy, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway and 
Denmark, and others in Africa, South America and Asia, involving shared 
access to global communications and exchanges of technical information 
and techniques.
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directed at friendly states.25 The first issue concerns what 
legal authority there should be for the state to compel (and 
subsidize) an Internet company to create and retain digital 
records of customer activity and furnish the authorities 
with data about the use of the service. An example would 
be the issue of a subpoena or warrant to an Internet 
Service Provider or Internet company for access to data 
in the Cloud or real-time transmission. The second issue 
concerns the ability of intelligence agencies to collect 
digital data without the knowledge or cooperation of the 
companies, in other words, as classic secret intelligence 
collection activities. An example would be an intelligence 
survey using cyber exploitation to place secretly, without 
the assistance of a third party, a harvesting tool on a device 
or network to identify the members of a child abuse 
network.
After the first round of publicity over the Snowden 
material, US President Barack Obama was forced to order 
an immediate “blue ribbon” inquiry into the conduct of the 
NSA and, subsequently, to make a major public statement 
and publish for the first time his directive to the NSA26 to 
govern SIGINT collection. The President’s Commission 
and the US Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board 
both aired arguments over the potential unconstitutionality 
of certain domestic collection programs. The US Congress 
has continued to debate reforms in the relevant intelligence 
legislation, but the outcome is uncertain. 
In order to examine the implications of the Snowden 
allegations, the European Parliament is conducting its 
own inquiry into the alleged electronic mass surveillance 
of European citizens.27 The United Kingdom is conducting 
several inquiries.28 The German Bundestag has set up 
25  Some care is needed in interpreting published material. The 
interception of the mobile telephone of Chancellor Angela Merkel of 
Germany was not denied, but the journalistic claims concerning the 
interception by NSA of large numbers of European telephone calls (for 
example, in France, Germany, Spain, Netherlands and Norway) turned 
out to be interception by the agencies of those nations themselves of calls 
overseas and shared with the United States. See Aid (2013). 
26  See The White House (2014). 
27  The evidence of Edward Snowden to the European Parliamentary 
inquiry can be found at www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/
cont/201403/20140307ATT80674/20140307ATT80674EN.pdf.
28  A major review into interception is under way by the think tank, the 
Royal United Services Institute, at the request of the UK deputy prime 
minister. The UK government has also set up a statutory review to look at 
the capabilities and powers required by law enforcement and the security 
intelligence agencies, and the regulatory framework within which those 
capabilities and powers should be exercised. In the light of the Snowden 
material, the Intelligence and Security Committee of the UK Parliament 
has reported that the current powers of digital interception are essential, 
that the UK agencies operate at all times within human rights and national 
law, including applying the principles of proportionality and necessity, 
but that new consolidating legislation is now needed to provide much 
greater transparency for the citizen on how the law operates. Their report 
can be found at http://isc.independent.gov.uk/.
a special committee for broadly the same purpose. The 
German government has also announced that it will 
transfer its government e-services from the US carrier 
Verizon to the domestic provider, Deutsche Telekom, 
ostensibly for reasons of protecting the privacy of 
German citizens and fears of US intelligence access via 
US providers (Troianovski and Yadron 2014).29 In 2014, the 
French government rapidly legislated to provide statutory 
legal authority for its ongoing interception activity under 
the Loi de programmation militaire adopted on December 
10, 2013 by the French senate. This law enables the French 
secret services to intercept any electronic communication, 
under the direct authorization of the French prime minister 
or president. German legislation also allows electronic 
interception, but is much more restrictive.30
Whether the result of all this controversy and debate will 
be consistent, coherent and effective reform, or whether it 
will even be in the interests of the citizens concerned, much 
remains to be seen. The outcome of the different strands of 
investigation, inquiry and political debate following the 
Snowden affair may well be changes to tighten up the way 
many democratic nations regulate intrusive intelligence 
activity and legislate to protect personal data.31 For some 
nations, learning about these advanced digital intelligence 
techniques will spur an effort to try to catch up, including 
increased monitoring of social media use by domestic 
publics. And, of course, there are major nations, such 
as Russia and China, that remain highly secretive about 
their national intelligence activity, and where it must be 
assumed that many of the techniques of intelligence access 
exposed by Edward Snowden are in regular use without 
the independent legal and parliamentary oversight 
mechanisms that are becoming common across democratic 
nations.
The Chinese government (along with a number of other 
governments) is reported as reappraising its reliance on 
major US Internet companies, concerns no doubt fuelled by 
the Snowden material.32 And Western governments are, in 
parallel, examining their reliance on Chinese information 
technology suppliers as some of the methods of digital 
29  In practice, intelligence penetration has little to do with the citizenship 
of the network provider or the location of the data. Rather, it turns on the 
technical ability of the intelligence agency to penetrate the target. 
30  See www.dw.de/germans-intercept-electronic-data-too-but-not-
much/a-16909606.
31  See, for example, the 2013 draft EU directive, “Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament of the Council Concerning 
Measures to Ensure a High Common Level of Network and Information 
Security across the Union,” the draft EU regulation on data protection, at 
ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection.
32  See, for example, http://seekingalpha.com/article/2387365-chinese-
restricting-of-apple-microsoft-and-symantec-are-harbingers-of-reduced-
growth and http://politics.slashdot.org/story/13/06/25/140232/
chinese-media-calls-for-boycott-of-cisco2014.
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intelligence become more generally known, including 
the United States and Australia excluding the Chinese 
company Huawei from critical national infrastructure-
related bids.33 The US Internet and technology companies 
themselves are busy reassuring their customers that 
their data will be made invulnerable to all unauthorized 
access — including the intelligence agencies of their own 
government. Behind this stance by the US companies lies 
the commercial reality that the Snowden disclosure of the 
scale of NSA access to communications carried by them 
risked hurting their business. Companies want to be able to 
say that their citizenship or the placement of their servers 
should not become a competitive disadvantage because 
of customer fears that they may be more amenable to or 
compliant with legal mandates to furnish information.
Although approximately 40 percent of the world 
population already has access to the Internet, most of this 
is in the developed world. The expected future growth in 
business upon which these US companies will depend will 
be in China and elsewhere in Asia and South Asia, South 
America and Africa. For some countries in these regions, 
there is a long-standing suspicion of the dominance of 
US technology companies able to extract wealth, coupled 
with a natural wish on the part of these countries to see 
the development of indigenous capability. US Internet 
companies are also now, following Snowden, regarded 
by such states as having facilitated US espionage, and, 
in effect, able to impose US interpretations of human 
rights on their citizens since decisions relating to their 
own law enforcement needs are being taken by private 
US-owned companies under US law. At the same time, 
most intelligence and security agencies around the world 
are no doubt trying to work out how to close an apparent 
capability gap with the United States. Meanwhile, Western 
intelligence agencies and law enforcement complain that 
the publicity given to digital intelligence means they are 
no longer able to gather evidence as before (Hogan-Howe 
quoted in Whitehead 2014) and that risks to the public are 
rising.34
For intelligence and law enforcement to be able to identify 
communications of interest and, where authorized, to 
access the content of relevant communications themselves 
is in fact a harder technical challenge than the many internal 
NSA PowerPoint presentations stolen by Snowden might 
suggest. Capabilities identified in the Snowden material 
that are said to be used by the United States (and, it must be 
assumed, by other leading nations) include the following:
• Access in bulk to substantial quantities of Internet 
traffic (although still representing a very small 
proportion of the total). Bulk access can be achieved 
33  See Intelligence and Security Committee (2013). 
34  A UK example can be seen in the comments by the Intelligence and 
Security Committee (2014).
by intercepting terrestrial microwave links,35 satellite 
links36 and undersea cables.37
• Collection and storage of intercepted metadata.38 
Saved metadata can provide information concerning 
when and to whom phone calls are made or emails 
and texts are sent. It may also reveal the location of 
mobile devices.
• Computerized identification of traffic39 likely to be 
of potential intelligence interest (as against the bulk 
of Internet traffic comprising machine-to-machine 
trading, streaming video films, pornography and so 
on) using deep packet inspection (DPI)40 techniques 
or equivalent. 
• Advanced “front end” tools to allow analysts to 
efficiently access and run advanced queries on 
intercepted data, in particular, in order to discover 
new leads in their investigations.41
• Cooperative access with the assistance of the 
companies concerned to commercial digital 
communications networks42 and “over-the-top” 
applications.
35  Both the United States and the Soviet Union developed geostationary 
SIGINT satellites during the Cold War in order to intercept spillover from 
microwave links deep inside each other’s territory.
36  For example, the Israeli capability. See http://mondediplo.com/ 
2010/09/04israelbase.
37  The GCHQ program TEMPORA is said to intercept bulk traffic 
on undersea fibre optic cables and buffer the data to allow warranted 
communications to be filtered out. The French Direction générale de la 
security extérieure (DGSE) is said to have an equivalent capability for 
trans-Mediterranean cables, operated in conjunction with the NSA 
(Follorou 2013). 
38  The Guardian revealed, from Snowden material, the alleged scope of 
the NSA’s giant database, Marina, for retaining metadata. See Ball (2013). 
39 An example is the NSA XKEYSCORE program. See 
https://edwardsnowden.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/2008-
xkeyscore-presentation.pdf.
40  DPI is a form of filtering used to inspect data packets sent from one 
computer to another over a network. The effective use of DPI enables 
its users to track down, identify, categorize, reroute or stop packets with 
undesirable code or data. DPI is normally more effective than typical 
packet filtering, which inspects only the packet headers.
41  The NSA program ICREACH is said to be able to handle upwards 
of five billion records every day, store them for a year, and make the 
database searchable by law enforcement and other US agencies and 
overseas partners (Gallagher 2014).
42  According to the 2014 Vodafone law enforcement disclosure, 29 of 
its operating businesses around the world were required by local law 
to cooperate in such access either for communications data, content or 
both, with, for some countries, an absence of clear legal regulation and 
no independent oversight (Vodafone 2014). Le Monde has alleged there 
is a cooperative relationship between Orange and the French external 
service, DGSE (Follorou 2014). 
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• Computer network exploitation through which the 
networks used by targets are infiltrated digitally to 
extract and gather data,43 or users’ computers are 
spoofed into connecting into controlled servers (or 
base stations in the case of mobile telephones) in 
so-called “man in the middle” or “man on the side” 
attacks.
• Close-access attacks on the devices themselves and on 
servers44 that are used by the target of an investigation 
by providing software or hardware implants that 
can facilitate network access to the machine, or by 
otherwise introducing malware.45 So-called “watering 
hole” attacks use compromised websites to introduce 
cookies to enable users to be tracked and identified (a 
technique used, for example, against both child abuse 
and jihadist networks).
• Monitoring of social media use (such as Twitter, 
Facebook, Pinterest, Tumblr, Instagram, Orkut, Bebo, 
Qzone, Flickr and many others) with the application 
of computerized analytics including sentiment 
analysis (Omand, Bartlett and Miller 2012). 
The mix of such methods exploited by nations obviously 
depends on ease of availability of access: for the United 
States, it appears from recent disclosures that access to 
digital data via the dominant US Internet companies has 
been especially important; for the United Kingdom and 
France, for historical and geographical reasons, undersea 
cable access has featured; for Germany, satellite access; for 
China and Russia, digital computer network exploitation 
appears from the cyber-security press to have been highly 
productive in recent years; and for many smaller African 
and South East Asian nations, cooperative access to local 
commercial mobile communications networks is important. 
The ease of access to social media also provides for any 
nation that feels it justified, a ready source of information 
on the attitudes and sentiment of local populations that 
would require only limited investment in interception and 
digital technology.
LEGAL AND SOCIETAL CONSTRAINTS
The digital intelligence tools and methods outlined above 
provide powerful means for a state to meet its fundamental 
responsibility to protect its citizens, but also, if so minded, 
43  Widespread use of this approach is said to be responsible for large-
scale theft of intellectual property from the United States and Western 
nations by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (Mandiant n.d.). 
44  See, for example, the allegations against both the NSA 
(https://edwardsnowden.com/2014/05/14/update-software-on-
all-cisco-ons-nodes) and Huawai (www.technologyreview.com/
news/429542/why-the-united-states-is-so-afraid-of-huawei/).
45  Russian government hackers are suspected of creating a highly 
sophisticated malware program, code-named Uroburos, designed to 
steal files from nation states’ digital infrastructure (Brewster 2014).
to acquire too much information about its citizens and to 
interfere with their liberties. The democracies have always, 
to greater or lesser extent and in a variety of different ways, 
tried to protect respect for the rights of their own citizens. 
2015 is the eight hundredth anniversary of the Magna 
Carta, which in turn, influenced the drafters of the US 
Constitution, whose Fourth Amendment (1789) prohibits 
for US persons unreasonable searches and seizures, and 
requires any warrant to be judicially sanctioned and 
supported by probable cause. The UN Declaration of 
Human Rights46 universalized this train of thought after 
World War II with the prohibition that “No one shall be 
subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, 
home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour 
and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection 
of the law against such interference or attacks.” All the 
members of the UN General Assembly subscribed to that 
declaration.
The universality of the right to respect for privacy 
means that it must apply to modern digital as well as 
more traditional means of communication. Four issues 
in particular arise here that are not fully resolved in 
international debate.
The first issue concerns what regulation should apply to 
the greatly increased amount of personal information that 
the individual discloses in the course of everyday life using 
the Internet, and, to a great extent, must disclose if the full 
value of the Internet to the individual is to be realized. 
Some of that information, such as credit card details, 
clearly must be protected. But other information, such as a 
person’s physical address, is likely only to be sensitive in 
some contexts and, in many jurisdictions, must be publicly 
available for voting purposes. Although great efforts are 
made to anonymize large datasets, which may produce 
useful medical research findings or public opinion data, 
for some time expert opinion has been warning that the 
number of digitized data points relating to an individual 
(including tagged images) are so great that too often it 
would be possible to re-identify individuals (Tene and 
Polonetsky 2002).
The second issue concerns how an invasion of privacy 
of digital communications is defined. Is it when the 
computer of an intercepting agency accesses the relevant 
packets of data along with the rest of the streams of digital 
information on a fibre optic cable or other bearer? Or is it 
when a sentient being, the intelligence analyst, can actually 
see the resulting information about the communication of 
the target? Perhaps the most damaging loss of trust from 
the Snowden allegations has come from the common 
but unwarranted assumption that access in bulk to large 
volumes of digital communications (the “haystack”) in 
order to find the communications of intelligence targets 
46  Article 12 of the UN Declaration of Human Rights is available at 
www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/.
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(the wanted “needles”) is evidence of mass surveillance of 
the population, which it is not.
The distinction is between authorizing a computer to search 
through bulk data on the basis of some discriminating 
algorithm to pull out sought-for communications (and 
discard the rest) and authorizing an analyst to examine the 
final product of the material thus filtered and selected. It is 
the latter step that governs the extent of, and justification 
for, the intrusion into personal privacy. The computer 
filtering is, with the right discriminator, capable (in theory, 
of course, not in actual practice) of selecting out any sought-
for communication. But that does not mean the population 
is under mass surveillance.47 Provided the discriminator 
and selection program chosen and used by the accessing 
computer only selects for human examination the material 
that a warrant has authorized, and the warrant is legally 
justified, then the citizens’ privacy rights are respected. Of 
course, if the selectors were set far too broadly and trawled 
in too much for sentient examination, then the exercise 
would fail to be proportionate (and would be unlawful, 
therefore, in most jurisdictions).
The third issue relates to the power of digital metadata 
(including revealing location, browsing history of 
Internet searches, and digital address, contact directories 
and diaries, and so on) to provide information about an 
individual said to be comparable in its degree of intrusion 
to accessing the content of communications themselves.48 
Traditionally, communications data on telephone calls 
was accessible in most jurisdictions on the authority of a 
senior police officer or investigating magistrate; access to 
the content of a call would require a higher level of judicial 
or equivalent warrant. One approach (taken by the United 
Kingdom in its interception legislation) is to stick to the 
traditional definition, and logically then to regard anything 
further possible from digital data (such as the browsing 
history) as content for which a warrant is needed.
The fourth issue is the question of extraterritoriality. 
Germany, for example, has put forward a number of 
47  This issue has recently been considered in respect of the Snowden 
allegations against the GCHQ by the statutory UK Interception 
Commissioner, who is a senior retired judge. He confirms in his annual 
report to Parliament for 2014 (available at www.iocco-uk.info/) that the 
GCHQ does have bulk access by computer to the Internet, but that is 
for the purpose of carefully targeted, highly discriminating selection of 
the communications of the targets where there are warrants authorizing 
interception with certificates attached, authorizing the targets whose 
communications are being sought. He has reported in the light of 
the Snowden allegations that everything the GCHQ does is properly 
authorized and legally properly justified, including under Article 8 of 
the European Human Rights convention regarding personal privacy. 
He confirmed categorically in his report that GCHQ does not conduct 
mass surveillance and that, furthermore, any such activity would be 
comprehensively unlawful. This judgement has been upheld by the UK 
courts. See UKIPTrib 13_77-H of December 5, 2014.
48  For example, the view of cryptanalyst Bruce Schneier (2013) that 
“Metadata equals surveillance; it’s that simple.” 
proposals at the United Nations essentially seeking 
an obligation on states to respect the laws of the state 
where the subject of potential surveillance is located. 
The argument is that, at present, judgements about the 
necessity and proportionality of digital investigations that 
potentially invade their citizens’ privacy are being made 
by judges and authorities in the United States (such as 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court) in accordance 
with US laws as opposed to German laws passed through 
a German democratic process. Paradoxically, for some 
non-democratic countries, there is an opposite concern 
that US privacy law overprotects US citizens and means 
that the US Internet companies do not have to disclose 
information about Internet use of their citizens that those 
states would want to monitor. This issue is, of course, 
linked to continuing and much wider arguments over 
the potential for there to be extraterritorial application of 
human rights law.
There is a separate argument about whether retention 
of unsorted data beyond a reasonable period, including 
buffering time taken to run a filtering program, 
constitutes mass surveillance given, the ease with which 
an individual’s data could be retrieved (an analogy civil 
libertarians sometimes use is the prospect of the state 
installing a camera in every bedroom with the promise 
only to look at your camera if justified with a judicial 
warrant); the analogy for digital intelligence is much more 
akin to the ability authorities have in the most serious cases 
of getting a judicial warrant to install a listening device 
in the home of a suspect — potentially, therefore, any 
home. That is a serious invasion of a person’s privacy, but 
it is not keeping the population or a substantial part of it 
under surveillance. So, when data is retained and held that 
potentially can allow privacy to be invaded, then controls 
over its access should be managed to the same standard as 
for any individual decision to conduct an act of intrusive 
surveillance. Just because the data is held in a digital 
database should not make the threshold for accessing it 
lower.
The caveat in the UN Human Rights Declaration that 
interference with privacy must not be “arbitrary” 
recognizes the steps a state may legitimately have to take 
in order to protect freedom and liberty, provided always 
that (in the words of Article 29), “In the exercise of his 
rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose 
of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and 
freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements 
of morality, public order and the general welfare in a 
democratic society.” Although the formulation predates 
the digital age, this need for balance within the basket of 
human rights, for example between the individual’s right 
to safety and security and right to privacy, remains valid 
today.
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Only a tiny minority that holds to the original “cyber punk” 
view of the Internet49 would argue for an unqualified 
absolute right to digital privacy. The Snowden material, 
which publicized the apparent scale of US counterterrorist 
and other intelligence activity, has nevertheless provoked 
a vigorous global debate over how best to ensure respect 
for the right to the privacy of one’s digital communications 
(and personal information accessible from Internet use) 
while meeting the state’s obligation to uphold the law, 
protect the right to life and security for the citizen — for 
example, against terrorist attacks — and protect the right 
to own and enjoy property — for example, against the 
depredations of serious criminals.
An analogy can be drawn with the balancing act required 
to justify the use of violence by the armed forces. The 
“just war” approach seeks to reconcile seeming opposites: 
states have a duty to defend their citizens and justice 
— protecting the innocent and defending moral values 
sometimes requires willingness to use force and violence, 
but taking human life or seriously harming individuals 
is wrong. From this tradition has come the jus ad bellum 
challenge of having to justify the decision to enter a conflict 
and the jus in bello criteria for right conduct once engaged, 
including proportionality, necessity, right authority and 
discrimination (between legitimate targets and civilians 
deserving of protection) that are to be found in the Geneva 
Conventions and in customary international law. The 
approach has also been applied to suggest specific ethical 
principles for secret intelligence activity (discussed further 
later in this paper) (Omand 2006).
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in a 
number of notable cases50 in the 1980s and 1990s gave 
judgments on claims that state authorities had violated the 
privacy rights51 of European citizens by using unlawful 
methods of investigation including wiretapping and 
bugging of premises. In a series of judgements, the ECtHR 
49  The classic statement is that of John Perry Barlow’s (1996) “Declaration 
of the Independence of Cyberspace”: “Governments of the Industrial 
World….You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where 
we gather….Cyberspace does not lie within your borders….You claim 
that there are problems among us that you need to solve. You use this 
as an excuse to invade our precincts….We are forming our own Social 
Contract. This governance will arise according to the conditions of our 
world not yours. Our world is different.”
50  Relevant ECtHR cases include Malone v. UK (1984) and Hewitt and 
Harman v. UK (1989). See echr-online.com/art-8-echr/introduction.
51  Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
provides that “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family 
life, his home and his correspondence. There shall be no interference 
by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in 
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of 
the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection 
of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others” (available at www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ 
ENG.pdf).
established clear guidelines for the member states of the 
Council of Europe. These include the need for there not 
to be an unfettered discretion for executive action and 
for controls on the arbitrariness of that action. In essence, 
convention jurisprudence recognizes the need for states 
to defend themselves and to introduce measures in 
support of national security including intrusive methods 
of surveillance,52 but insists that the impugned measures 
should have a basis in domestic law, which must be 
accessible to the person concerned who can foresee its 
consequences.53 In its case law on secret measures of 
surveillance,54 the court developed minimum safeguards 
that should be set out in statute law in order to avoid 
abuses of power: the nature of the offences that may give 
rise to an interception order (or warrant); a definition of the 
categories of people liable to have their telephones tapped; 
a limit on the duration of telephone tapping; the procedure 
to be followed for examining, using and storing the data 
obtained; the precautions to be taken when communicating 
the data to other parties; and the circumstances in which 
recordings may or must be erased or the tapes destroyed. 
Such safeguards are easily adapted to the digital world. 
In a case55 relating to surveillance using a covertly placed 
tracking device of movements in a public places, on the 
other hand, the EctHR established the principle that for 
measures that interfered less with the private life of the 
person concerned, the conditions could be less strict. 
There is an unresolved public policy issue for nations 
over how best to regulate intrusive surveillance by the 
authorities, drawing on arguments such as those of the 
ECtHR, at least for most democratic states. For example, 
from the point of view of the privacy interests of those 
individuals who are subject to investigative measures, it is 
difficult to draw a workable hierarchy of potential invasion 
of privacy through interception of digital communications 
data and content and other forms of highly intrusive 
intelligence such as the use of human agents or of 
52  The relevant UK Court, the Investigative Powers Tribunal, has 
recently rejected legal challenges to the GCHQ and the Foreign Secretary 
by Liberty, Privacy International, the American Civil Liberties Union, 
Amnesty International and other civil liberties organizations following 
the Snowden allegations. In an important judgment, the court found that 
that there is no contravention by the GCHQ of ECHR Articles 8 (Privacy) 
and 10 (Freedom of Expression). See UKIPTrib 13_77-H, of December 5, 
2014, at paragraph 161.
53  The ECtHR did accept, however, that the requirement of foreseeability 
in the special context of secret controls of staff affecting national security 
cannot be the same as in many other fields. Thus, it cannot mean that 
an individual should be enabled to foresee precisely what checks will be 
made in his regard. See Leander v. Sweden [1987] 9 EHRR 433 at paragraph 
51.
54  For example, Malone v. UK [1985] 7 EHRR 14, Uzun v. Germany [2011] 
53 EHRR 24 and Bykov v. Russia 437.8/02 21 January 2009.
55  Uzun v. Germany [2011] 53 EHRR 24.
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bugging devices.56 For instance, if an eavesdropping 
device is covertly installed in a target’s home, it may 
record conversations between family members that are 
more intimate and personal than those that might be 
recorded if the target’s telephone were to be intercepted 
(and this example becomes even clearer if, for instance, the 
telephone in question is used only by the target to contact 
his criminal associates).
The rule of law can be applied nationally to the world of 
intelligence, but there is no settled corpus of international 
law regulating secret intelligence activity itself, nor is there 
likely to be one given the universality of intelligence work 
(to which not all nations will admit) and the difficulties of 
arriving at international consensus on defining the practice 
(Yoo and Sulmasy 2007). All nations, on the other hand, 
make espionage against them a criminal offence. There 
is no positive obligation on a state to prevent or forestall 
another nation from intercepting the communications of 
its citizens,57 nor is receiving the product of intelligence 
activity acquiescence in such activity. Nations will always 
do what they feel is necessary for national security.58 
Nevertheless, the world of secret intelligence need not 
be ethics-free any more than the world of warfare and 
nations can agree voluntarily to abide by standards widely 
accepted as representing responsible state behaviour.
A THREE-LAYER MODEL OF SECURITY AND 
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY ON THE INTERNET
Edward Snowden’s allegations highlight a major 
unresolved public policy issue. Like all such wicked public 
policy issues, there are several dimensions or layers to the 
problem. There are interactions — and conflicts — between 
the requirements of these layers that cannot be wished 
away and can only be managed by a holistic approach that 
recognizes that each layer has to be considered alongside 
the others. Optimize the policy instruments in only one 
of the dimensions and the result will be unexpected and 
unwelcome consequences in the others. The problem needs 
to be tackled as a whole. To examine this proposition, the 
following sections discuss the nature of intelligence and 
security activity on the Internet in terms of three layers:
56  This argument by the UK government was accepted by the court 
examining claims of unlawful interception. See [2014] UKIPTrib 13_77-H, 
para 32 et seq.
57  At least that would be an interpretation of the long-standing principle 
established by the ECtHR in Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation v. UK (1978) 
14 D&R 117. In the words of the UK Court of Appeal, the ECHR contains 
no requirement that a signatory state should take up the complaints of 
any individual within its territory touching the acts of another sovereign 
state. See www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2006/1279.html.
58  The member states of the European Union have, for example, always 
withheld competence on matters of national security from the European 
Commission, seeing these as the prerogative of the nations themselves, 
meeting in the European Council of Ministers. 
• the everyday level of normal Internet activity and the 
threats society faces in using and getting the most out 
of cyberspace;
• the law enforcement level, trying to police at least the 
worst criminal excesses on the Internet; and
• the secret intelligence level, with agencies working to 
fulfill their national security mission but also capable 
of supporting law enforcement. 
The Everyday Level of Internet Use
In the top layer is everyday activity on the Internet: 
communicating, sharing, entertaining and trading. 
Retaining confidence in the Internet and its financial 
systems and transactions is fundamental for global 
economic well-being. This was recognized by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
in 2011 when it published a recommended set of principles 
for Internet policy making, including: promoting and 
protecting the global free flow of information; promoting 
the open, distributed and interconnected nature of the 
Internet; promoting investment and competition in high-
speed networks and services; and promoting and enabling 
the cross-border delivery of services.59
The appropriate norms to be worked up here relate to:
• recognition of the primary importance of the Internet 
for economic and social progress and for economic 
development;
• multi-stakeholder principles being applied to the 
governance of the different aspects of the efficient 
functioning of the Internet; and
• net neutrality, sensibly interpreted to allow effective 
management of high latency services. 
The principal threat to Internet confidence comes from 
the rapid increase in malware on the Internet designed, 
for the most part, for criminal gain. Cybercrime of all 
types is the most rapidly growing form of crime, driven 
by highly professional gangs largely based outside their 
target nations that use malware to make large criminal 
gains from fraud, as well as simply using cyberspace to 
conduct classic criminal activity at scale: stealing money, 
organizing narcotics, WMD and people smuggling, 
blackmail and extortion rackets. Some of this crime exploits 
the characteristics of software directly. Some could be 
characterized as simply traditional forms of crime (theft, 
for example) that can be perpetrated digitally at a much 
lower risk than old-fashioned analogues such as robbing 
banks. Some traditional illegal trading is made possible at 
scale by the existence of the dark Net component of the 
Internet (such as Silk Road and similar illegal marketplaces 
59  See www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/49258588.pdf.
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selling drugs and counterfeit items). The scale of Internet 
criminal enterprise itself spawns criminal marketplaces for 
false identities, credit card details and malware exploits 
that can be used for criminal purposes. 
On the dark Net, beyond the indexing of Google, and 
accessible only with Tor or other anonymization software, 
jihadist beheading videos are circulated. Guns and 
weapons of all kinds, counterfeit goods, drugs, sex and 
slaves are sold. And this is where the cybercriminal can 
acquire the latest malware for their attacks.
An increasing number of nations are realizing the 
importance of consumer and business confidence in 
the Internet and are devoting considerable resources 
to improving cyber security, including through better 
education on the risks and counter-measures to be taken. 
Secure encryption and sound security protocols are 
needed for everyday communications to protect private 
communications and financial transactions and defeat 
global cybercriminals. 
Alleged exploits of the NSA to get around hard encryption 
in pursuit of the external national security mission have 
raised doubts about whether software used for the 
everyday purposes of commerce and socializing has been 
weakened.60 When flaws are detected in software systems 
(as they are all the time, given the staggering complexity 
of modern software and the interactions of applications, 
operating systems and communications) there is potential 
tension with (as inferred from some of the Snowden 
material) the value to intelligence agencies of exploiting 
such flaws and exploits. Nevertheless, sound military 
reasoning would argue that a defence being breached is 
much more serious than losing the hypothetical value 
of a future tool. It would seem appropriate, therefore, to 
consider having norms here:
• To encourage the disclosure of software vulnerabilities 
in the interests of getting them fixed, and when it is a 
choice of keeping vulnerability for future covert use 
or disclosing it to bolster cyber defence, and it is a 
close call, the defence should always win. 
• A nation under cyber attack should be able to call for, 
and expect, international support, and there needs 
to be the network of CERTS (Computer Emergency 
Response Teams) to provide it.
60  Tim Berners-Lee has criticized the NSA in those terms and has called 
for an Internet Magna Carta. Berners-Lee and the World Wide Web 
Consortium, a global community with a mission to lead the Web to its full 
potential, have launched a year of action for a campaign called the Web 
We Want, urging people to push for an Internet “bill of rights” for every 
country. See www.bdimedia.com/blog/happy-birthday-internet-web-
founder-berners-lee-now-calls-magna-carta-protect-internet-users/.
• Nations should sign up to the UN Human Rights 
Council Resolution 20/8 that the rights that apply in 
the offline world apply in cyberspace, too.
• Specifically, as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) Tallinn Manual61 states, international 
humanitarian law applies in cyberspace, too. So, 
the constraints of humanitarian law in warfare, the 
principle of discrimination to protect civilians, avoid 
collateral damage and so on, apply to cyber attacks.
• In the long term, it might even be possible to 
contemplate among the permanent five members 
of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) an 
agreement that it is in each state’s interest not to 
invite potentially fatal crisis instability by trying to 
plant cyber Trojan malware in key space and nuclear 
command and control systems. 
Everyday Internet use is also the level at which data 
protection legislation, both national and international (for 
example, the new draft European Union Data Protection 
Regulation and Directive), kicks in to protect citizens’ 
personal data from unlawful use. Such data protection 
is based on identifying and protecting personal data 
by insisting on the consent of the subject. Under the 
latest proposals, the subject would be given the “right 
to be forgotten” and thus the legal power to compel the 
deletion of personal data. Conflicts are already arising 
between jurisdictions with different interpretations of 
safeguarding and disclosing personal data, and erasing 
it. More international discussion is needed in order to 
establish agreement that to minimize conflicting and 
overlapping legal jurisdictions, national data protection 
legislation should be based on common principles such 
as sanctioning negligence in the safeguarding of personal 
data and misusing personal data for unlawful purposes.
The increasing dependence on the Internet for the 
routines of everyday life — and for the critical national 
infrastructure, such as power, telecommunications, 
transport and logistics, on which the normal life of the 
citizen depends — introduces new vulnerabilities into 
society. Even where systems are air-gapped from the 
Internet, such as the control systems for nuclear plants, the 
potential exists for breaches of security through the access 
required for visiting contractors or the staff of the facility 
themselves. The threat is from malicious hackers intent 
on disruption in support of their own causes or simply 
to prove a point, from criminals seeking gain through 
economic blackmail and from potentially hostile states.
61  The NATO Tallinn Manual was the outcome of a detailed 
expert study of international law applicable to cyberspace. See 
https://ccdcoe.org/tallinn-manual.html.
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Law Enforcement Activity on the Internet
Supporting the everyday level, therefore, is a layer of law 
enforcement activity by police, customs, immigration, 
child protection, civil contingencies and other authorities 
attempting to control the worst excesses of criminality, and 
to uphold the law and ensure the continuity of essential 
services. As earlier noted, the volume and nature of 
Internet communications and the claim asserted by some 
to an individual’s right to anonymity in cyberspace62 pose 
issues for law enforcement. Areas for norm construction 
for everyday activity might therefore include the need 
for an international norm that accepts Internet freedom 
of expression and personal privacy as fundamental rights 
as provided for in the UN Declaration (and national 
constitutions such as the US Constitution), but accepts 
explicitly that they are not absolute rights — they have to 
be qualified by other rights of the citizen such as the right 
to live in peace and to enjoy one’s property. So, there is 
also no absolute right to anonymity on the Internet, but it 
is a part of the right to privacy that has to be respected 
and interference with it justified. Specifically, agreement 
that the Internet cannot be allowed to be a safe space 
for criminal activity by allowing absolute protection for 
personal communications.
The current work of law enforcement in attempting to 
police the top level of everyday Internet use has had some 
successes,63 but in most states, law enforcement is falling 
further and further behind. Conventional non-cyber crime 
is decreasing in many nations as digital crime offers higher 
rewards at lower risk in terms of probability of detection 
and length of sentence if caught. The problems this poses 
for law enforcement include the following:
• As noted earlier, criminals of all types, including 
terrorists, use the same range of mobile devices and 
applications as everyone else, including the ability to 
disguise or strongly encrypt their communications 
and thus to hide criminal conspiracies.
• Traditional criminal investigation tools such as those 
derived from telephone billing information and 
wiretapping are increasingly ineffective as more 
communications switch to the Internet.
• There are insufficient numbers of suitably qualified 
cyber-trained officers capable of dealing with the 
volume of criminal activity on the Internet, including 
coping with a rising volume of cyber fraud, and 
of specialist officers capable of pursuing the most 
complex of cases to successful prosecution.
62  A right to anonymity was never conceded by states in the world of 
three dimensions to apply to those committing crimes or harming society.
63  Examples include the international cooperation led by the FBI that 
resulted in the taking down of the dark Web criminal sites Silk Road 1 
and Silk Road 2, and the arrest of a number of suspects.
• The need to follow cyber attacks in near-real time, and 
the difficulties of attributing attacks that are bounced 
off servers located in different countries severely 
tests mechanisms of international law enforcement 
cooperation based on traditional models. The process 
for requests under Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties 
may not be the most appropriate mechanism for 
international cooperation required in the cyber age. 
• It is in the nature of the Internet that victims and 
offenders are mostly no longer in proximity and a 
single offender can use the Internet to attack multiple 
victims across many police areas and national 
jurisdictions. Some of the most persistent and capable 
criminal groups are based in jurisdictions that do not 
or cannot respond fully to requests for assistance or 
to extradition requests/arrest warrants.
• Cyber criminals can buy exploits in dark markets as 
well as access to credit card and other personal details 
of potential victims, and do not need advanced hacker 
skills themselves.64
There needs, therefore, to be active domestic law 
enforcement activity on the Internet, supporting everyday 
life, and trying to police the worst abuses of cyberspace. 
One of the biggest challenges is the absence of global 
agreement on dual criminality across a wide rage of cyber-
related offences (including the nature of hate speech). 
The nature of the Internet is that for every nation there 
will be communications and websites that offend against 
domestic law (for example, by exhibiting images of child 
abuse, glorifying terrorism or expressing racial or other 
hate crime), following a set of norms that are widely 
recognized internationally:
• As is the practice within the European Union, there 
needs to be the widest possible international mutual 
legal recognition of certain clear classes of criminal 
offence that are cyber enabled, including child abuse 
(the double or dual criminality test that an act is, in 
law, a crime in all the jurisdictions involved), and 
cyber dependent, such as ransom-ware. 
• The basic principles of necessity and proportionality, 
to be found in international and national human rights 
law, should be applied throughout law enforcement 
activity.
64  In September 2014, a report from Europol’s European Cybercrime 
Centre, Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment, revealed the diffusion 
of the business model in underground communities and highlighted that 
barriers to entry in cybercrime rings are being lowered even if criminal 
gangs have no specific technical skills. Criminals can rent a botnet of 
machines for their illegal activities, to infect thousands of machines 
worldwide. These malicious infrastructures are built with a few 
requirements that make them suitable for the criminals, including user-
friendly command-and-control infrastructure and sophisticated evasion 
techniques. 
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• The Internet companies responsible for maintaining 
global networks cannot be expected to take on 
the role of policing the Internet, but they can and 
should take steps to enable those who do have that 
legal responsibility to exercise it properly, provided 
that such steps are legally authorized. Steps should 
include retention of communications metadata, 
under appropriate safeguards and retention periods, 
and, if necessary, financed by national government.
• The close cooperation of Internet companies with law 
enforcement is essential both in their own interests to 
help manage cybercriminal attacks and in supporting 
criminal investigations that affect their customer 
confidence and profitability, and in the interests 
of corporate social responsibility, for example by 
removing illegal content. 
• Cooperation with law enforcement should include 
prompt response to proper legal warrants for 
requests for information about subscribers and their 
use of the Internet and about threats to public safety 
and security.
Intelligence Activity in Cyberspace
To help overcome the problems of policing cyberspace, 
law enforcement in many nations is increasingly 
looking to national intelligence agencies for support. 
Some nations have specifically legislated to allow their 
national intelligence community to provide support for 
law enforcement65 and the priority given to domestic 
counterterrorism has accentuated this trend. There are 
of course differences. Modern law enforcement has an 
intelligence function (for example, mapping crime hot 
spots to allow targeted policing). But most of the time, law 
enforcement is seeking evidence after the crime has been 
committed that can be deployed as part of an open judicial 
process and whose legitimate derivation and meaning can 
be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Intelligence work is 
often described as probabilistic, as a jigsaw puzzle and as 
incomplete, fragmentary and sometimes wrong.66 Digital 
intelligence can often generate leads for follow-up by 
conventional law enforcement methods designed to gather 
specific evidence, such as visual surveillance or the search 
of a premises.
The opportunity offered by mobile phone geo-location is 
an example of a digital technique that has been quickly 
65  The EctHR has recognized the prevention and detection of serious 
crime as a legitimate purpose for intrusive intelligence activity along 
with national security and economic well-being.
66  “To supplement their knowledge in areas of concern where 
information is, for one reason or another, inadequate, governments turn 
to secret sources. Information acquired against the wishes and (generally) 
without the knowledge of its originators or possessors is processed by 
collation with other material, validation, analysis and assessment and 
finally disseminated as ‘intelligence’” (Butler 2004).
taken up by police services, for example, to test alibis, 
eliminate suspects from an inquiry and help track down 
the perpetrators of multiple serious crimes. The power of 
keeping track, over a period of time, of the location of a 
mobile device (and what other mobile phones or devices 
might have been in the close vicinity of that device) is 
clearly of interest to the police, but is potentially very 
intrusive, as has been recognized by parliamentarians 
and civil liberties organizations. Nevertheless, for some 
jurisdictions, there are still constitutional concerns over 
the sharing of intelligence with conventional domestic 
police services and, in some cases, historical tensions due 
to past disputes over competence and territory. There is 
also a tension between the inevitably top-down federal 
nature of state intelligence activity and the local nature 
of policing in which “the police are the public and the 
public are the police,” where the ability of the police to 
perform their duties is dependent upon public approval 
of police existence, actions, behaviour and the ability of 
the police to secure and maintain public respect.67 One of 
the consequences of the Snowden affair is such questions 
are being increasingly posed in relation to national digital 
intelligence activity.
In general, national intelligence agencies have been ahead 
of police services in exploiting the more advanced digital 
information sources. For many, including the United States, 
the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand 
(the Five Eyes partnership that emerged from World 
War II) and the NATO nations, their SIGINT capabilities 
naturally developed into capability and cooperation in 
digital realms, and the same has been true for many other 
nations, including China, Russia, India, Japan, South 
Korea, Taiwan, Israel, Sweden and Finland. The Snowden 
material provides glimpses not only into US, Five Eyes 
and NATO digital intelligence but also into the capabilities 
that can be assumed of other nations.68 In some cases, 
the claims of advanced techniques can be assumed to be 
spurring on others to follow suit.
An inevitable consequence of the purpose of secret 
intelligence being to obtain information that others are 
trying to hide is the essential part played by secrecy. The 
effectiveness of secret intelligence rests on sources and 
methods that must remain hidden, otherwise the targets 
know how to avoid detection. Oversight of intelligence 
activity cannot, therefore, be fully transparent and has 
67  The second of the 1829 principles of law enforcement (upon the 
founding of Scotland Yard). See www.durham.police.uk/About-Us/
Documents/Peels_Principles_Of_Law_Enforcement.pdf.
68  In his speech at the Department of Justice on January 17, 2014, 
President Obama said, “We know that the intelligence services of other 
countries — including some who feign surprise over the Snowden 
disclosures — are constantly probing our government and private sector 
networks, and accelerating programs to listen to our conversations, 
and intercept our emails, and compromise our systems. We know that” 
(Obama 2014). 
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to be by proxy: by senior judges and a limited number of 
parliamentarians who can, on society’s behalf, be trusted 
to enter the “ring of secrecy” and give confidence that legal 
and ethical standards are being maintained.
Whatever view is taken of the legitimacy of Edward 
Snowden as a genuine whistleblower and of the 
proportionality of his actions,69 his allegations have, in 
many respects, breached the necessary minimum secrecy 
that should surround details of intelligence sources and 
methods. It is important to recognize that the resulting 
damage to intelligence collection applies globally, not just 
to the agencies exposed by Snowden, from:70
• the scale of publicity sensitizing terrorists and 
criminal groups to the whole issue of digital 
intelligence, warning suspects of the need to be more 
secure and, for example, criminal networks to change 
their operating methods and equipment;
• highlighting/compromising specific types and 
methods of intelligence collection, and exposing gaps 
in coverage that provide signposts for criminal and 
hostile actors on how to reduce the probability of 
detection;
• accelerating the commercial information and 
communication technology sector’s move to hard 
encryption on devices and software that cannot be 
overcome even with legal warrants (the response 
of the intelligence agencies is likely to be to try to 
get much closer to their targets, with consequential 
greater moral hazard of collateral intrusion);
• reduction in Internet company cooperation with law 
enforcement and government agencies as they seek 
to protect their commercial reputations for being able 
to secure their customers’ data (and thus also prevent 
competitors deriving value from the content they are 
carrying); and
• the risk of overregulation due to fears of mass 
surveillance.
69  Snowden has said his greatest concern was with what he saw as the 
unconstitutional nature of the NSA’s bulk collection and storage program 
of the metadata of communications of US citizens, authorized under 
s.215 of the USA PATRIOT Act 2001. President Obama acknowledged 
the sensitivity of this program in his speech. The large volume of 
classified material (circa 170,000 documents) Snowden stole and passed 
to investigative journalists to expose went much wider than domestic 
surveillance, including US and NATO support to military operations. 
In addition, he passed on 58,000 top-secret documents taken from the 
British partner agency GCHQ. See www.headoflegal.com/2013/08/30/
r-miranda-v-home-secretary-witness-statement-of-oliver-robbins/.
70  See www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/11300936/
GCHQ-warns-serious-criminals-have-been-lost-in-wake-of-Edward-
Snowden-leaks.html.
The main justification for all intelligence activity, including 
digital, remains national security, including support for 
the armed forces and for defensive alliances such as NATO 
and cooperative organizations such as the African Union. 
Where powerful digital intelligence tools exist, it is natural 
for law enforcement to seek support (or in some cases, 
such as social media, monitoring to acquire their own 
capability).
It is a proper use of national intelligence resources to 
support law enforcement, provided that the use of 
intrusive methods is legally regulated, as they would be if 
used by law enforcement itself.
As earlier noted, more often than not nowadays a 
common feature of the demands placed on an intelligence 
community by the armed forces and law enforcement 
alike are for actionable intelligence about people — the 
terrorists, insurgents, cyber- and narco-criminal gangs, 
people traffickers and pedophile networks, cyber-vandals 
and hackers. For such targets, what is likely to be sought as 
of most value are their identities (a non-trivial issue given 
digital anonymity), associations, location, movements, 
financing and intentions. Often, large issues of public policy 
rest on the outcome of intelligence on dictators committing 
or threatening to carry out war crimes. For example, trying 
to establish whether there are Russian paramilitaries in 
Eastern Ukraine, on which UNSC and European Council 
sanctions decisions may rest. Or whether Islamic State of 
Iraq and the Levant jihadists in Iraq and Syria, responsible 
for the appalling executions of hostages, will bring their 
campaign to domestic streets in Europe, America and 
the Middle East. Of course, there are still demands from 
governments for intelligence on the activities of some 
traditional states, including friendly states where their 
intentions in specific areas engage vital national security 
interests71 — but even in such cases the communications of 
interest are likely to be carried on virtual private networks 
on the Internet.
Not all intelligence requirements are, however, of 
equal importance or urgency. The limited budgets for 
intelligence activity at a time of general austerity in public 
expenditure (at least in most democratic nations) should 
force prioritization. Most of the top priorities will be 
obvious — in supporting the armed forces on operations 
and in providing leads for counterterrorist operations to 
protect the public, or where there are important diplomatic 
decisions to be taken, as with the negotiations with Iran 
over its nuclear enrichment program and over sanctions 
on Russia in relation to its actions in Ukraine. Intelligence 
agencies also have the task of providing strategic warning 
of new threats not yet on policy makers’ radar, and leeway 
71  Relevant here is President Obama’s 2014 statement directing the US 
intelligence community not to monitor the communications of heads 
of state and government of close friends and allies, unless there is a 
compelling national security purpose. See The White House (2014).
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has to be allowed in authorizing intelligence collection 
operations accordingly, and in allowing intelligence 
relationships to be developed with other states.
Nations should make timely arrangements for sharing 
securely intelligence warnings on threats to the public, 
and, in relation to terrorism, should establish appropriate 
points of contact between national counterterrorism 
analysis centres or authorities.72
Most security and intelligence authorities see themselves 
as having a duty to seek and use information, including 
digital intelligence, to help manage threats to public and 
national security. Secret intelligence, because it involves 
overcoming the determined efforts of others, such as 
terrorists, to prevent it being acquired, inevitably involves 
running moral hazard such as collateral intrusion upon 
privacy of those such as family members who may be 
entirely innocent. Like law enforcement at the start of 
an investigation, it is also often necessary to examine a 
number of witnesses to a crime or associates of suspects in 
order to eliminate them from enquiries. The examination 
of those later shown to be innocent of wrongdoing is an 
inevitable consequence of investigative law enforcement. It 
should also be recognized that the powerful tools of digital 
intelligence are already being used in some repressive 
non-democratic countries for censorship and control of 
dissidents. 
There are already, from the work of the EctHR and from 
academic legal scholarship, suggestions for internationally 
acceptable norms on how such activity is organized in 
order to reduce the risk of intelligence activity being 
abused. Taken together, and underpinned by domestic 
law, these form a new social contract in which, through 
democratic process, the public accepts the need for some 
infringement of privacy (within limits) in return for the 
government’s commitment to keep the public secure:
• Intelligence agencies should be placed on a national 
legal footing with the organizations concerned having 
legal personalities.
• The purposes of secret intelligence should be 
restricted by law — for example, excluding its use 
for domestic political purposes and for commercial 
advantage.
• Investigative activity should be regulated by 
black letter law — there should not be secret law 
unavailable to the citizen.
• Highly intrusive methods should be authorized 
under a warranting system laid down by law.
72  This suggested area for norm development follows the thrust of 
the UNSC Resolution 1373 adopted unanimously after the attacks of 
September 11, 2001.
• There should be independent oversight of 
intelligence activity, with sufficient access through 
some combination of judicial and parliamentary 
means, to ensure that the law is being applied and 
that the policies being followed are in accordance 
with democratic wishes. It would be best practice for 
governments to publish statistics on the scale of use 
of warranted digital intrusive methods.
• There should be the means for an independent court 
to assess claims of abuse of these powers, able to 
provide redress if proven, together with the authority 
to set matters right after mistakes have been made, 
for example, by having an individual removed from 
a watch-list or no-fly list.
There are also important principles of proportionality 
and necessity that should apply to legislation governing 
the intelligence agencies, so those authorizing intelligence 
activity, the regulators and overseers, and those inside the 
agencies all recognize the legal duty they have to satisfy 
themselves that the degree of intrusion or moral hazard 
likely to be occurred is in proportion to the harm to 
national security or public safety that is to be prevented 
or the benefit to be gained. Additionally, the operation 
must be necessary to help achieve the approved purpose, 
and must be one whose purpose could not reasonably be 
achieved in another way that did not have to involve secret 
intelligence. Not everything that technically can be done, 
should be done. Edward Snowden’s allegations about the 
interception of the mobile telephone of Angela Merkel, the 
German chancellor, prompted President Obama to issue 
his own norm73 on the interception of the communications 
of the leaders of friendly states: intelligence agencies 
should not, unless there is a compelling national security 
purpose, monitor the communications of heads of state 
and government of close friends and allies.
The analogy between the ethics that might responsibly 
apply to the activities of secret intelligence and those of 
the “just war” tradition underlying humanitarian law was 
referred to earlier. In brief, as applied to digital intelligence, 
appropriate norms might cover the following ground:
• There must be sufficient sustainable cause. There 
needs to be a check on any tendency for the secret 
world to expand into areas unjustified by the scale 
of potential harm to national interests, including 
73   See Obama (2014).
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public safety, so the purposes of intelligence should 
be limited by statute.74 
• All concerned must behave with integrity. Integrity 
is needed throughout the whole system, from the 
reasons behind requirements, and the actions taken 
in the collection, through to the analysis, assessment 
and use of the resulting intelligence. 
• The methods to be used must be proportionate. 
The likely impact and intrusion into privacy of the 
proposed intelligence collection operation, taking 
account of the methods to be used, must be in 
proportion to the harm that it is sought to prevent 
and the mechanisms for determining proportionality 
need to be tested through independent oversight. 
• There must be right authority. There must be 
a sufficiently senior authorization of intrusive 
operations and accountability up a recognized chain 
of command to permit effective oversight. Right 
authority too has to be lawful and respectful of 
internationally accepted human rights.
• There must be reasonable prospect of success. 
Even if the purpose is valid and the methods to be 
used are proportionate to the issue, there needs to be 
discrimination and selectivity (no large-scale “fishing 
expeditions”75) with a hard-headed assessment of 
how to manage the risk of collateral intrusion on 
others.
• Necessity. Recourse to the specific method of 
secret intelligence collection should be necessary 
for achieving the authorized mission and should 
certainly not be used if there are open sources that 
can provide the information being sought.
CONCLUSION
As a result of pressure from civil rights organizations 
following Snowden, governments are rightly re-examining 
processes and legal frameworks for intelligence activity 
and seeking to improve oversight mechanisms. No doubt 
the outcome of such inquiries will help the development 
74  An example is the UK’s Intelligence Services Act, which only permits 
the national intelligence agencies to act “(a) in the interests of national 
security, with particular reference to the defence and foreign policies of 
Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom; or (b) in the interests 
of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom in relation to the 
actions or intentions of persons outside the British Islands; or (c) in 
support of the prevention or detection of serious crime” (Government of 
the United Kingdom 1994). 
75  Law enforcement is used to having to show “probable cause” in 
relation to intrusive investigation of suspects. Such a criterion cannot 
simply be transferred over to secret intelligence, which is often seeking 
discovery of threats yet to crystalize and new threat actors yet to be 
identified. Nevertheless, “general warrants” remain unlawful both in the 
United States and the United Kingdom.
of norms based on well-understood and tested principles 
that can help democratic societies regulate necessary 
digital intelligence activity in ways that respect the right 
to privacy and that help ensure that confidence is retained 
in the Internet. 
The domestic legal framework of regulation and oversight 
within which intelligence activity has to be conducted will 
— and should — inevitably constrain the free interplay 
of demand for and potential supply of intelligence, not 
least derived from digital sources. That constraint also 
inevitably involves the public avowal of intelligence 
activity, and the according of legal status to the agencies 
that collect and analyze secret intelligence, as well as 
the provision of at least enough information outside the 
secret circles of agency activity to enable confidence in 
their activity to be justified publicly. It is not enough for 
the insiders to be confident that there are very effective 
safeguards. It is also essential for the democracies that 
digital intelligence is seen to be regulated effectively by 
applying safeguards that are recognized to give assurance 
of ethical behaviour, in accordance with modern views of 
human rights, including respect for personal privacy. 
If — and it is a risk — nations are overzealous in response 
to Edward Snowden in constraining digital intelligence-
gathering capability and data sharing, then the interests 
of national publics will be failed, since governments will 
not be able to manage the risks from terrorism, cybercrime 
and other criminality, nor will they have the intelligence 
on which sound policy decisions can be made. If, on the 
other hand, nations fail to exercise sufficient restraint 
on the use of the powerful digital tools in the hands 
of their intelligence agencies, and fail to be believed in 
doing so, then the resulting unease on the part of a vocal 
section of national publics and in such bodies as the 
European Parliament will destabilize the very intelligence 
communities whose work is essential in the collective 
interest to manage twenty-first-century risks.
Manifesting norms that law enforcement and security 
and intelligence agencies clearly abide by will go a long 
way to meet the challenge that intelligence agencies in the 
democracies must also be seen to behave consistently in 
ways that the public considers ethically sound.
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